

Examiner's rejections in the Office Action to which this communication is responsive, Applicants submit that the requirement to elect between the multiple polypeptides of the instant application was improper (see argument, below) and Applicants have amended the claims to remedy this oversight. Applicants will offer to elect a reasonable number of sequences following allowance of portions of the claims directed to the polypeptide of SEQ ID NO:25 and the corresponding polynucleotide of SEQ ID NO:102. In the event that the Examiner insists upon only examining one type of polypeptide (and the polynucleotide encoding the polypeptide), despite Applicants' arguments, and therefore requires that only part of Applicants' claims be elected, Applicants hereby provisionally elect the portions of the claims directed to the polypeptide of SEQ ID NO:25 and the corresponding polynucleotide of SEQ ID NO:102, with traverse.

With respect to the requirement for election between the polypeptides and corresponding polynucleotides of the instant application, the Examiner's attention is directed to the Patent Office's own requirements for Markush practice, set forth in the 7<sup>th</sup> edition of the M.P.E.P. (July 1998) at § 803.02 regarding restriction requirements in Markush-type claims:

#### PRACTICE RE MARKUSH-TYPE CLAIMS

If the members of the Markush group are **sufficiently few in number or so closely related** that a search and examination of the entire claim can be made without serious burden, the examiner must examine all claims on the merits, even though they are directed to independent and distinct inventions. In such a case, the examiner will not follow the procedure described below and will not require restriction.

Since the decisions in *In re Weber*, 580 F.2d 455, 198 USPQ 328 (CCPA 1978) and *In re Haas*, 580 F.2d 461, 198 USPQ 334 (CCPA 1978), **it is improper for the Office to refuse to examine that which applicants regard as their invention**, unless the subject matter in a claim lacks unity of invention. *In re Harnish*, 631 F.2d 716, 206 USPQ 300 (CCPA 1980); and *Ex parte Hozumi*, 3 USPQ2d 1059 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1984). Broadly, **unity of invention exists where compounds included within a Markush group (1) share a common utility and (2) share a substantial structural feature disclosed as being essential to that utility.**

This subsection deals with Markush-type generic claims which include a plurality of alternatively usable substances or members. In most cases, a recitation by enumeration is used because there is no appropriate or true generic language. A Markush-type claim can include independent and distinct inventions. This is true where two or more of the

members are so unrelated and diverse that a prior art reference anticipating the claim with respect to one of the members would not render the claim obvious under 35 U.S.C. 103 with respect to the other member(s). In applications containing claims of that nature, **the examiner may require a provisional election of a single species** prior to examination on the merits. The provisional election will be given effect in the event that the Markush-type claim should be found not allowable. Following election, the Markush-type claim will be examined fully with respect to the elected species and further to the extent necessary to determine patentability. If the Markush-type claim is not allowable over the prior art, examination will be limited to the Markush-type claim and claims to the elected species, with claims drawn to species patentably distinct from the elected species held withdrawn from further consideration.

As an example, in the case of an application with a Markush-type claim drawn to the compound C-R, wherein R is a radical selected from the group consisting of A, B, C, D, and E, the examiner may require a provisional election of a single species, CA, CB, CC, CD, or CE. The Markush-type claim would then be examined fully with respect to the elected species and any species considered to be clearly unpatentable over the elected species. If on examination the elected species is found to be anticipated or rendered obvious by prior art, the Markush-type claim and claims to the elected species shall be rejected, and claims to the nonelected species would be held withdrawn from further consideration. As in the prevailing practice, a second action on the rejected claims would be made final.

On the other hand, should no prior art be found that anticipates or renders obvious the elected species, the search of the Markush-type claim will be extended. If prior art is then found that anticipates or renders obvious the Markush-type claim with respect to a nonelected species, the Markush-type claim shall be rejected and claims to the nonelected species held withdrawn from further consideration. The prior art search, however, will not be extended unnecessarily to cover all nonelected species. Should applicant, in response to this rejection of the Markush-type claim, overcome the rejection, as by amending the Markush-type claim to exclude the species anticipated or rendered obvious by the prior art, the amended Markush-type claim will be reexamined. The prior art search will be extended to the extent necessary to determine patentability of the Markush-type claim. In the event prior art is found during the reexamination that anticipates or renders obvious the amended Markush-type claim, the claim will be rejected and the action made final. Amendments submitted after the final rejection further restricting the scope of the claim may be denied entry. [emphasis added]

As can be seen from the above, it is clear that the present Restriction Requirement does not meet the Patent Office's own requirements.

First, the number of "members of the Markush group are **sufficiently few in number or so closely related** that a search and examination of the entire claim can be made without serious

burden, the examiner must examine all claims on the merits, even though they are directed to independent and distinct inventions. **In such a case, the examiner will not follow the procedure described below and will not require restriction.**” Withdrawal of the restriction requirement as between at least a reasonable number of the specific sequences each in the claims is required on that basis alone.

Second, **“it is improper for the Office to refuse to examine that which applicants regard as their invention**, unless the subject matter in a claim lacks unity of invention. ... Broadly, **unity of invention exists where compounds included within a Markush group (1) share a common utility and (2) share a substantial structural feature disclosed as being essential to that utility.**” Clearly, the polypeptides of the instant invention, and polynucleotide sequences encoding them, share both a common utility and structural homology, based on their classification as human cathepsin proteins.

Third, even if the claims could be considered to be “Markush-type generic claims which include a plurality of alternatively usable substances or members,” it is further noted that the M.P.E.P states that “A Markush-type claim can include independent and distinct inventions. This is true where two or more of the members are so unrelated and diverse that a prior art reference anticipating the claim with respect to one of the members would not render the claim obvious under 35 U.S.C. 103 with respect to the other member(s). In applications containing claims of that nature, **the examiner may require a provisional election of a single species** prior to examination on the merits.” This clearly applies in the present case.

## II. RESPONSE TO OFFICE ACTION

Applicants' invention is directed to, *inter alia*, substantially purified polynucleotides encoding a human signal peptide-containing protein (SEQ ID NO:25) and to the use of these sequences in the diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of cancer and immunological disorders. Nucleic acids encoding SEQ ID NO:25 were first identified in Incyte Clone 1634813 from the cecal tissue cDNA library (COLNNOT19) using a computer search for amino acid sequence alignments. A consensus sequence, SEQ ID NO:102, was derived from Incyte Clones 1634813 (COLNNOT19), 2904583 (THYMNOT05), 1634813 (COLNNOT19), and 1310492 (COLNFET02), and shotgun sequence SAPA04436. Northern analysis shows the expression of

this sequence in gastrointestinal, developmental, hematopoietic, and immunological cDNA libraries. Approximately 50% of these libraries are associated with fetal development/cell proliferation and 25% with immune response.

SEQ ID NO:25 is 150 amino acids in length and has one potential N-glycosylation site at N139; five potential phosphorylation sites at T48, S118, S126, S135, and S136, and a signal peptide sequence encompassing residues M1-A23. SEQ ID NO:25 shares 28% identity with mouse beta chemokine, Exodus-2 (GI 2196924; Hromas, R. et al. (1997) J. Immunol. 159:2554-2558). This mouse homologue is unusual in its ability to selectively stimulate T-lymphocyte chemotaxis.

#### NEW CLAIMS

Applicants have replaced original Claims 2-14 with newly added Claims 24-33, drawn to the same invention, which clarifies the claimed subject matter. Applicants submit that newly added Claims 34-39 (as well as newly added Claim 29, which corresponds to original Claim 14, now canceled, which was already grouped along with the claims directed toward polynucleotides in the restriction requirement dated 30 Sept. 1998) are drawn to methods of use of the polynucleotides of Claims 24-28 and 30-33 and should be examined together, per the Commissioner's Notice in the Official Gazette of March 26, 1996, entitled "Guidance on Treatment of Product and Process Claims in light of *In re Ochiai*, *In re Brouwer* and 35 U.S.C. § 103(b)" which sets forth the rules, upon allowance of product claims, for rejoinder of process claims covering the same scope of products. Applicants therefore respectfully request the reconsideration of all newly added claims submitted herein.

#### Objections Under 37 CFR 1.75(c)

Original claims 2-8 were objected to under 37 CFR 1.75(c), as being of improper dependent form. These claims have been canceled and replaced by newly added claims 24-39. The objection is now moot.

Rejections Under 35 U.S.C. § 101

Claims 2-14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 based on the allegation that the claimed invention lacks patentable utility. The rejection alleges in particular that:

Claims 2-14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is drawn to an invention with no apparent or disclosed specific and substantial utility. The instant application has provided a description of an isolated DNA encoding a protein and the protein encoded thereby. The instant application does not disclose the biological role of this protein or its significance [page 4, top].

The instant situation is directly analogous to that which was addressed in *Brenner v. Manson*, 148 U.S.P.Q. 689 (Sus. Ct, 1966), in which a novel compound which was structurally analogous to other compounds which were known to possess anti-cancer activity was alleged to be potentially useful as an anti-tumor agent in the absence of evidence supporting its utility [page 4, middle].

There is absolutely no evidence of record or any other line of reasoning that would support a conclusion that the claimed DNA encoding a signal peptide-containing protein can be used in the “diagnosis, treatment and prevention of cancer and immunological disorders... Until some actual and specific significance can be attributed to the protein of SEQ ID NO:25, encoded by the DNA of SEQ ID NO:102, the instant invention is incomplete [page 5, middle].

**The rejection of original claims 2-14 is improper, as the claims have a patentable utility as set forth in the instant specification, and/or a utility well-known to one of ordinary skill in the art.**

The invention at issue is a polynucleotide sequence corresponding to a gene that is expressed in human gastrointestinal, developmental, hematopoietic, and immunological tissues. As such, the claimed invention has numerous practical, beneficial uses in toxicology testing, drug development, and the diagnosis of disease, none of which necessarily require detailed knowledge of how the polypeptide coded for by the polynucleotide works. As a result of the benefits of these uses, the claimed invention already enjoys significant commercial success.

Any of these uses meets the utility requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101 and, derivatively, § 112, first paragraph. Under these sections of the Patent Act, the patent applicant need only show that the claimed invention is “practically useful,” *Anderson v. Natta*, 480 F.2d 1392, 1397, 178 USPQ 458 (CCPA 1973) and confers a “specific benefit” on the public. *Brenner v. Manson*,

383 U.S. 519, 534-35, 148 USPQ 689 (1966). As discussed in a recent Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit case, this threshold is not high:

An invention is "useful" under section 101 if it is capable of providing some identifiable benefit. See *Brenner v. Manson*, 383 U.S. 519, 534 [148 USPQ 689] (1966); *Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.*, 977 F.2d 1555, 1571 [24 USPQ2d 1401] (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("to violate Section 101 the claimed device must be totally incapable of achieving a useful result"); *Fuller v. Berger*, 120 F. 274, 275 (7th Cir. 1903) (test for utility is whether invention "is incapable of serving any beneficial end").

*Juicy Whip Inc. v. Orange Bang Inc.*, 51 USPQ2d 1700 (Fed. Cir. 1999). In *Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC*, 945 F.2d 1173, 1180, 20 USPQ2d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 1991) the United States Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit explained:

An invention need not be the best or only way to accomplish a certain result, and it need only be useful to some extent and in certain applications: "[T]he fact that an invention has only limited utility and is only operable in certain applications is not grounds for finding lack of utility." *Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc.*, 730 F.2d 753, 762, 221 USPQ 473, 480 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

If persons of ordinary skill in the art would understand that there is a "well-established" utility for the claimed invention, the threshold is met automatically and the applicant need not make any showing to demonstrate utility. Manual of Patent Examination Procedure at § 706.03(a). Only if there is no "well-established" utility for the claimed invention must the applicant demonstrate the practical benefits of the invention. *Id.*

Once the patent applicant identifies a specific utility, the claimed invention is presumed to possess it. *In re Cortright*, 165 F.3d 1353, 1357, 49 USPQ2d 1464; *In re Brana*, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566; 34 USPQ2d 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In that case the Patent Office bears the burden to demonstrate that a person of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably doubt that the asserted utility could be achieved by the claimed invention. *Ids.* To do so, the PTO must provide evidence or sound scientific reasoning. See *In re Langer*, 503 F.2d 1380, 1391-92, 183 USPQ 288 (CCPA 1974). If and only if the Patent Office makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the applicant to provide rebuttal evidence that would convince the person of ordinary skill that there is sufficient proof of utility. *Brana*, 51 F.3d at 1566. The applicant need only prove a "substantial likelihood" of utility; certainty is not required. *Brenner*, 383 U.S. at 532.

The rejection fails to demonstrate either that the Applicants' assertions of utility are legally insufficient or that a person of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably doubt that they could be achieved. For these reasons alone the rejections should be overturned.

There is, however, an additional, independent reason to overturn the rejections: to the extent the rejections are based on Revised Interim Utility Examination Guidelines (64 FR 71427, December 21, 1999) and Revised Interim Utility Guidelines Training Materials (USPTO Website [www.uspto.gov](http://www.uspto.gov), March 1, 2000), the Guidelines and Training Materials are themselves inconsistent with the law. These inconsistencies are discussed separately below.

**I. The use of the instant polynucleotides for the toxicological screening of pharmaceutical compound libraries, rationally-designed pharmaceutical compositions, or xenobiotic compounds are sufficient utilities under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 112, first paragraph**

The claimed invention meets all of the necessary requirements for establishing a credible utility under the Patent Law: There is a "well-established" use for the claimed invention, there are specific practical and beneficial uses for the invention, and those uses are substantial. Objective evidence, not considered by the Patent Office, further corroborates the credibility of the asserted utilities.

**A. The use of human polynucleotides and their encoded polypeptides as tools for toxicology testing, drug discovery, and the diagnosis of disease is "well-established"**

In recent years, scientists have developed important techniques for toxicology testing, drug development, and disease diagnosis. Many of these techniques rely on expression profiling, in which the expression of numerous genes is compared in two or more samples. Genes or gene fragments known to be expressed, such as the invention at issue, are tools essential to any technology that uses expression profiling. Likewise, proteome expression profiling techniques have been developed in which the expression of numerous polypeptides is compared in two or more samples. Polypeptide or polypeptide fragments known to be expressed are tools essential to any technology that uses proteome expression profiling. See, *e.g.*, Sandra Steiner and N. Leigh Anderson, Expression profiling in toxicology -- potentials and limitations, Toxicology Letters 112-13:467 (2000).

The technologies made possible by expression profiling and the DNA and polypeptide tools upon which they rely are now well-established. The technical literature recognizes not only the prevalence of these technologies, but also their unprecedented advantages in drug development, testing and safety assessment. One of these techniques is toxicology testing, used in both drug development and safety assessment. Toxicology testing is now standard practice in the pharmaceutical industry. See, *e.g.*, John C. Rockett, et al., Differential gene expression in drug metabolism and toxicology: practicalities, problems, and potential, *Xenobiotica* 29(7):655, 656 (1999):

Knowledge of toxin-dependent regulation in target tissues is not solely an academic pursuit as much interest has been generated in the pharmaceutical industry to harness this technology in the early identification of toxic drug candidates, thereby shortening the developmental process and contributing substantially to the safety assessment of new drugs.

To the same effect are several other scientific publications, including Emile F. Nuwaysir, et al., Microarrays and Toxicology: The Advent of Toxicogenomics, *Molecular Genesis* 24:153 (1999); Sandra Steiner and N. Leigh Anderson, *supra*.

Nucleic acids useful for measuring the expression of whole classes of genes are routinely incorporated for use in toxicology testing. Nuwaysir et al. describes, for example, a Human ToxChip comprising 2089 human clones, which were selected

... for their well-documented involvement in basic cellular processes as well as their responses to different types of toxic insult. Included on this list are DNA replication and repair genes, apoptosis genes, and genes responsive to PAHs and dioxin-like compounds, peroxisome proliferators, estrogenic compounds, and oxidant stress. Some of the other categories of genes include transcription factors, oncogenes, tumor suppressor genes, cyclins, kinases, phosphatases, cell adhesion and motility genes, and homeobox genes. Also included in this group are 84 housekeeping genes, whose hybridization intensity is averaged and used for signal normalization of the other genes on the chip.

*See also* Table 1 of Nuwaysir et al. (listing additional classes of genes deemed to be of special interest in making a human toxicology microarray).

The more genes that are available for use in toxicology testing, the more powerful the technique. "Arrays are at their most powerful when they contain the entire genome of the species they are being used to study." John C. Rockett and David J. Dix, Application of DNA Arrays to Toxicology, *Environ. Health Perspec.* 107(8):681 (1999). Control genes are carefully selected for their stability across a large set of array experiments in order to best study the effect of



toxicological compounds. See attached email from the primary investigator, Dr. Cynthia Afshari to an Incyte employee, dated July 3, 2000, as well as the original message to which she was responding. Thus, there is no expressed gene which is irrelevant to screening for toxicological effects, and all expressed genes have a utility for toxicological screening. This is true for both polynucleotides and polypeptides encoded by them.

There are numerous additional uses for the information made possible by expression profiling. Expression profiling is used to identify drug targets and characterize disease. See Rockett et al., *supra*. It also is used in tissue profiling, developmental biology, disease staging, etc. There is simply no doubt that the sequences of expressed human genes all have practical, substantial and credible real-world utilities, at the very least for expression profiling.

Expression profiling technology is also used to identify drug targets and analyze disease at the molecular level, thus accelerating the drug development process. For example, expression profiling is useful for the elucidation of biochemical pathways, each pathway comprising a multitude of component polypeptides and thus providing a pool of potential drug targets. In this manner, expression profiling leads to the optimization of drug target identification and a comprehensive understanding of disease etiology and progression.

There is simply no doubt that the sequences of expressed human polynucleotides and polypeptides all have practical, substantial and credible real-world utilities, at the very least for biochemical pathway elucidation, drug target identification, and assessment of toxicity and treatment efficacy in the drug development process. Sandra Steiner and N. Leigh Anderson, *supra*, have elaborated on this topic as follows:

The rapid progress in genomics and proteomics technologies creates a unique opportunity to dramatically improve the predictive power of safety assessment and to accelerate the drug development process. Application of gene and protein expression profiling promises to improve lead selection, resulting in the development of drug candidates with higher efficacy and lower toxicity. The identification of biologically relevant surrogate markers correlated with treatment efficacy and safety bears a great potential to optimize the monitoring of pre-clinical and clinical trials.

In fact, the potential benefit to the public, in terms of lives saved and reduced health care costs, are enormous. Recent developments provide evidence that the benefits of this information are already beginning to manifest themselves. Examples include the following:

- In 1999, CV Therapeutics, an Incyte collaborator, was able to use Incyte gene expression technology, information about the structure of a known transporter gene, and chromosomal mapping location, to identify the key gene associated with Tangier disease. This discovery took place over a matter of only a few weeks, due to the power of these new genomics technologies. The discovery received an award from the American Heart Association as one of the top 10 discoveries associated with heart disease research in 1999.
- In an April 9, 2000, article published by the Bloomberg news service, an Incyte customer stated that it had reduced the time associated with target discovery and validation from 36 months to 18 months, through use of Incyte's genomic information database. Other Incyte customers have privately reported similar experiences. The implications of this significant saving of time and expense for the number of drugs that may be developed and their cost are obvious.
- In a February 10, 2000, article in the *Wall Street Journal*, one Incyte customer stated that over 50 percent of the drug targets in its current pipeline were derived from the Incyte database. Other Incyte customers have privately reported similar experiences. By doubling the number of targets available to pharmaceutical researchers, Incyte genomic information has demonstrably accelerated the development of new drugs.

Because the Patent Examiner failed to address or consider the "well-established" utilities for the claimed invention in toxicology testing, drug development, and the diagnosis of disease, the Examiner's rejections should be overturned regardless of their merit.

**B. The use of polynucleotides encoding signal peptide-containing proteins for toxicology testing, drug discovery, and disease diagnosis are practical uses that confer "specific benefits" to the public**

Even if, *arguendo*, toxicology testing, drug development and disease diagnosis (through expression profiling) are not well-established utilities (which expressly is not conceded), the claimed invention nonetheless has specific utility by virtue of its use in each of these techniques. There is no dispute that the claimed invention is in fact a useful tool in each of these techniques. That is sufficient to establish utility for both the polypeptide and the polynucleotides encoding it.

Nevertheless, the claimed invention is rejected on the grounds that it does not have a "specific utility" absent a detailed description of the actual function of the protein expressed by the claimed nucleic acid or identification of a "specific" disease it can be used to treat. Apparently relying on the Training Materials, the rejection is made based on a scientifically incorrect and legally unsupportable assertion that identification of the family or families of

proteins to which the claimed invention belongs, without more, does not satisfy the utility requirement. None of these grounds is consistent with the law.

**1. A patent applicant can specify a utility without any knowledge as to how or why the invention has that utility**

It is settled law that how or why any invention works is irrelevant to determining utility under 35 U.S.C. § 101: “[I]t is not a requirement of patentability that an inventor correctly set forth, or even know, how or why the invention works.” *In re Cortright*, 165 F.3d, at 1359 (quoting *Newman v. Quigg*, 877 F.2d 1575, 1581, 11 USPQ2d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). *See also Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc.*, 720 F.2d 1565, 1570, 219 USPQ 1137 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[I]t is axiomatic that an inventor need not comprehend the scientific principles on which the practical effectiveness of his invention rests.”). It follows that the patent applicant need not set forth the particular functionality of the claimed invention to satisfy the utility requirement.

Practical, beneficial use, not functionality, is at the core of the utility requirement. *Supra* (introduction to § I). So long as the practical benefits are apparent from the invention without speculation, the requirement is satisfied. *Standard Oil Co. v. Montedison*, 664 F.2d 356, 374, 212 USPQ 327 (3d Cir. 1981); *see also Brana*, 51 F.3d at 1565. To state that a biological molecule might be useful to treat some unspecified disease is not, therefore a specific utility. *In re Kirk*, 376 F.2d 936, 945, 153 USPQ 48 (C.C.P.A. 1967). The molecule might be effective, and it might not.

However, unlike the synthetic molecules of *Kirk*, the claimed invention is **known** to be useful. It is not just a random sequence of speculative use. Because it is expressed in **humans**, a person of ordinary skill in the art would know how to use the claimed polynucleotide and/or polypeptide sequences -- without any guesswork -- in toxicology testing, drug development, and disease diagnosis regardless of how the polynucleotide or the protein it encodes actually functions. The claimed invention could be used, for example, in a toxicology test to determine whether a drug or toxin causes any change in the expression of secreted proteins (e.g., chemokines). Similarly, the claimed invention could be used to determine whether a specific medical condition, such as cancer, affects the expression of signal peptide-containing secreted proteins and, perhaps in conjunction with other information, serve as a marker for or to assess the stage of a particular disease or condition.

In fact, the claimed polypeptide and/or polynucleotide sequences could be used in toxicology testing and diagnosis without **any** knowledge (although this is not the case here) of the protein for which it codes: it could serve, for example, as a marker of a toxic response, or, alternatively, if levels of the claimed polypeptide or polynucleotide remain unchanged during a toxic response, as a control in toxicology testing. Diagnosis of disease (or fingerprinting using expression profiles) can be achieved using arrays of numerous identifiable, expressed DNA sequences, or by two-dimensional gel analysis of the expressed proteins themselves, notwithstanding lack of any knowledge of the specific functions of the proteins they encode.

**2. A patent applicant may specify a utility that applies to a broad class of inventions**

The fact that the claimed invention is a member of a broad class (such as DNA sequences or the proteins they encode expressed in humans) that includes sequences other than those claimed that also have utilities in toxicology testing, drug discovery, disease diagnosis, etc. does not negate utility. Practical utilities can be directed to classes of inventions, irrespective of function, so long as a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand how to achieve a practical benefit from knowledge of the class. *Montedison*, 664 F.2d at 374-75. The law has long assumed that inventions that achieve a practical use also achieved by other inventions satisfy the utility requirement. For example, many materials conduct electricity. Likewise, many different plastics can be used to form useful films. *Montedison*, 664 F.2d at 374-75; *Natta*, 480 F.2d at 1397. This is a general utility (practical films) that applies to a broad class of inventions (plastics) which satisfies the utility requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101.

Not all broad classes of inventions are, by themselves, sufficient to inform a person of ordinary skill in the art of the practical utility for a member of the class. Some classes may indeed convey too little information to a person of ordinary skill in the art. These may include classes of inventions that include both useful and nonuseful members. *See In re Ziegler*, 992 F.2d 1197, 1201, 26 USPQ2d 1600 (Fed. Cir. 1993). In some of these cases, further experimentation would be required to determine whether or not a member of the class actually has a practical use. *Brenner*, 383 U.S. at 534-35.

The broad class of steroids identified in *Kirk* is just such a class. It includes natural steroids (concededly useful) and man-made steroids, some of which are useful and some of

which are not. Indeed, only a small fraction of the members of this broad class of invention may be useful. Without additional information or further experimentation, a person of ordinary skill in the art would not know whether a member of the class falls into the useful category or not. This could also be the case for the broad class of “plastic-like” polypropylenes in *Ziegler*, which includes many -- perhaps predominately -- useless members.

The PTO routinely issues patents whose utility is based solely on the claimed inventions’ membership in a class of useful things. The PTO presumably would issue a patent on a novel and nonobvious fishing rod notwithstanding the lack of any disclosure of the particular fish it might be used to catch. The standard being promulgated in the Guidelines and in particular as exemplified in the Training Materials, and being applied in the present rejection, would appear to warrant a rejection, however, on the grounds that the use of the fishing rod is applicable to the general class of devices used to catch fish.

The PTO must apply the same standard to the biotechnological arts that it applies to fields such as plastics and fishing equipment. *In re Gazave*, 379 F.2d 973, 977-78, 154 USPQ 92 (CCPA 1967) quoting *In re Chilowsky*, 299 F.2d 457, 461, 108 USPQ 321 (CCPA 1956) (“[T]he same principles should apply in determining operativeness and sufficiency of disclosure in applications relating to nuclear fission art as in other cases.”); see also *In re Alappat*, 33 F.3d 1526, 1566, 31 USPQ2d 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Archer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Discoveries and inventions in the field of digital electronics are analyzed according to the aforementioned principles [concerning patentable subject matter] as any other subject matter.”). Indeed, there are numerous classes of inventions in the biotechnological arts that satisfy the utility requirement.

Take, for example, the class of interleukins expressed in human cells of the immune system. Unlike the classes of steroids or plastic-like polypropylenes in *Kirk* and *Ziegler*, all of the members of this class have practical uses well beyond “throwaway” uses. All of them cause some physiological response (in cells of the immune system). All of the genes encoding them can be used for toxicology testing to generate information useful in activities such as drug development, even in cases where little is known as to how a particular interleukin works. No additional experimentation would be required, therefore, to determine whether an interleukin has

a practical use. It is well-known to persons of ordinary skill in the art that there is no such thing as a useless interleukin.

Because all of the interleukins, as a class, convey practical benefit (much like the class of DNA ligases identified in the Training Materials), there is no need to provide additional information about them. A person of ordinary skill in the art need not guess whether any given interleukin conveys a practical benefit or how that particular interleukin works.

Another example of a class that by itself conveys practical benefits is the G protein-coupled receptors (“GPCRs”). GPCRs are well-known as intracellular signaling mediators with diverse functions critical to complex organisms. They perform these functions by binding to and interacting with specific ligands. They are targets of many current drug treatments, including anti-depressants, anti-histamines, blood pressure regulators, and opiates.

Newly-identified GPCRs are used intensively in the real-world, even in cases where neither the specific ligand that binds to the GPCR or the precise biological function of the GPCR is known. Newly identified GPCRs are used, for example, as toxicity controls for drug candidates known to bind other GPCRs. Because a person of ordinary skill in the art would know how to use any GPCR to achieve a practical benefit, even without any detailed or particular knowledge as to how it works, GPCRs as a class meet the utility requirement.

In fact, all isolated and purified naturally-occurring polynucleotide and polypeptide sequences which are expressable (i.e., which are not pseudogenes that are never expressed during any natural biological process) can be and **are** used in a real-world context as tools for toxicological testing, e.g., for drug discovery purposes. This utility applies to all sequences actually expressed, yet in each case, the utility of the sequence is quite specific, e.g., insofar as it is used to detect its own specific complementary sequence in a sample containing many different sequences.

Human signal peptide-containing proteins, like chemokines, interleukins, GPCRs and fishing rods is a class that by itself conveys practical benefits. Unlike steroids and “plastic-like” polypropylenes, all of the signal peptide-containing proteins are expressed by humans, and all of them can be used as tools for toxicology testing. The claimed invention could be used, for example to determine whether a drug candidate affects the expression of signal peptide-containing proteins (e.g., chemokines) in humans, how it does so, and to what extent. There are

no useless chemokines, interleukins, GPCRs, or other signal peptide-containing proteins. As these are practical, real-world uses, the application need not describe particular functionality or medical applications that would only supplement the utilities known to exist already.

**C. Because the use of signal peptide-containing proteins in toxicology testing, drug discovery, and disease diagnosis are practical uses beyond mere study of the invention itself, the claimed invention has substantial utility.**

In addition to conferring a specific benefit on the public, the benefit must also be “substantial.” *Brenner*, 383 U.S. at 534. A “substantial” utility is a practical, “real-world” utility. *Nelson v. Bowler*, 626 F.2d 853, 856, 206 USPQ 881 (CCPA 1980).

The claimed invention’s use as a tool for toxicology testing is just such a practical, real-world use. The PTO nonetheless rejected the claims at issue on the ground that the use of an invention as tool for research is not a “substantial” use. Because the PTO’s rejection assumes a substantial overstatement of the law, it must be overturned.

There is no authority for the proposition that use as a tool for research is not a substantial utility. In fact, the PTO issues patents for inventions whose only use is to facilitate research, such as DNA ligases. These are acknowledged by the PTO’s Training Materials themselves to be useful.

Only a limited subset of research uses are not “substantial” utilities: those in which the only known use for the claimed invention is to be an **object** of further study, thus merely inviting further research. This follows from *Brenner*, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that a process for making a compound does not confer a substantial benefit where the only known use of the compound was to be the object of further research to determine its use. *Id.* at 535. Similarly, in *Kirk*, the held that a compound would not confer substantial benefit on the public merely because it might be used to synthesize some other, unknown compound that would confer substantial benefit. *Kirk*, 376 F.2d at 940, 945 (“What applicants are really saying to those in the art is take these steroids, experiment, and find what use they do have as medicines.”). Nowhere do those cases state or imply, however, that a material cannot be patentable if it has some other beneficial use in research.

As used in toxicology testing, drug discovery, and disease diagnosis, the claimed invention has a beneficial use in research other than studying the claimed invention or its protein

products. It is a tool, rather than an object, of research. The claimed invention has numerous other uses as a research tool, each of which alone is a “substantial utility” and is supported in the specification. These include: the use of antisense polynucleotides corresponding to SEQ ID NO:102 to reduce the expression of a target signal peptide-containing proteins in vivo (page 94), the transduction of cells with viral vectors or naked DNA harboring the polynucleotide sequence of SEQ ID NO:102 to replace or augment expression of a signal peptide-containing proteins that is absent or reduced as a result of genetic defects or environmental insults (page 94), the in vitro expression of signal peptide-containing proteins followed by the administration of soluble or lipid-associated polypeptide to a patient in need of such treatment (pages 96-100), and chromosome mapping for the diagnosis of genetic abnormalities.

#### **D. Objective evidence corroborates the utilities of the claimed invention**

There is in fact no restriction on the kinds of evidence a Patent Examiner may consider in determining whether a “real-world” utility exists. Indeed, “real-world” evidence, such as evidence showing actual use or commercial success of the invention, can demonstrate conclusive proof of utility. *Raytheon v. Roper*, 220 USPQ2d 592 (Fed. Cir. 1983); *Nestle v. Eugene*, 55 F.2d 854, 856, 12 USPQ 335 (6th Cir. 1932). Indeed, proof that the invention is made, used or sold by any person or entity other than the patentee is conclusive proof of utility. *United States Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.*, 865 F.2d 1247, 1252, 9 USPQ2d 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1989).

Over the past several years, a vibrant market has developed for databases containing all expressed genes (along with the polypeptide translations of those genes), in particular genes having medical and pharmaceutical significance such as the instant sequence. (Note that the value in these databases is enhanced by their completeness, but each sequence in them is independently valuable.) The databases sold by Applicants’ assignee, Incyte, include exactly the kinds of information made possible by the claimed invention, such as tissue and disease associations. Incyte sells its database containing the claimed sequence and millions of other sequences throughout the scientific community, including to pharmaceutical companies who use the information to develop new pharmaceuticals.



## II. The Patent Examiner Failed to Demonstrate That a Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art Would Reasonably Doubt the Utility of the Claimed Invention

In addition to alleging a “specific” use for the claimed subject matter, a patent applicant must present proof that the claimed subject matter is in fact useful. *Brana*, 51 F.3d at 1565-66. The applicant need only prove a “substantial likelihood” of utility; certainty is not required. *Brenner*, 383 U.S. at 532.

The amount of evidence required to prove utility depends on the facts of each particular case. *In re Jolles*, 628 F.2d 1322, 1326, 206 USPQ 885 (CCPA 1980). “The character and amount of evidence may vary, depending on whether the alleged utility appears to accord with or to contravene established scientific principles and beliefs.” *Id.* Unless there is proof of “total incapacity,” or there is a “complete absence of data” to support the applicant’s assertion of utility, the utility requirement is met. *Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.*, 977 F.2d 1555, 1571, 24 USPQ2d 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1992); *Envirotech*, 730 F.2d at 762.

A patent applicant’s assertion of utility in the disclosure is presumed to be true and correct. *In re Cortright*, 165 F.3d at 1356; *Brana*, 51 F.3d at 1566. If such an assertion is made, the Patent Office bears the burden in the first instance to demonstrate that a person of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably doubt that the asserted utility could be achieved. *Ids.* To do so, the PTO must provide evidence or sound scientific reasoning. *See Langer*, 503 F.2d at 1391-92. If and only if the Patent Office makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the applicant to provide rebuttal evidence that would convince the person of ordinary skill that there is sufficient proof of utility. *Brana*, 51 F.3d at 1566. The Revised Guidelines are in agreement with this procedure. *See Revised Interim Guidelines* at ¶¶ 3-4.

The issue of proof often arises in the chemical and biotechnological arts when the patentee asserts a utility for a claimed chemical compound based on its homology or similarity to another compound having a known, established utility. In such cases, the applicant can demonstrate “substantial likelihood” of utility by demonstrating a “reasonable correlation” between the utility -- not the function -- of the known compound and the compound being claimed. *Fujikawa v. Wattanasin*, 93 F.3d 1559, 1565, 39 USPQ2d 1895 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Accordingly, under *Brana*, the Patent Office must accept the asserted utility unless it can show that a person of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably doubt that a “reasonable correlation” exists. If the

Patent Office makes such a showing, however, the applicant may submit evidence in support of the correlation.

In the present case, the specification clearly discloses a substantially purified polynucleotide (SEQ ID NO:102) encoding a human signal peptide-containing protein (SEQ ID NO:25). Northern analysis shows the expression of this polynucleotide in gastrointestinal, developmental, hematopoietic, and immunological cDNA libraries. Approximately 50% of these libraries are associated with fetal development/cell proliferation and 25% with immune response. The polypeptide of SEQ ID NO:25 is 150 amino acid residues in length, has a potential N-glycosylation site at N139; has five potential phosphorylation sites at T48, S118, S126, S135, and S136, and has a signal peptide sequence encompassing residues M1-A23. SEQ ID NO:25 shares 28% identity with mouse beta chemokine, Exodus-2 (GI 2196924; Hromas, R. et al. (1997) J. Immunol. 159:2554-2558), an unusual chemokine in its ability to selectively stimulate T-lymphocyte chemotaxis.

The only evidence of record shows that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not doubt that SEQ ID NO:102 is in fact a polynucleotide encoding a human signal peptide-containing protein, which is known to have a specific utility.

By ignoring the “reasonable correlation” requirement in the case law and failing to illustrate the procedure established by *Brana*, the Examiner has failed to set forth a proper *prima facie* case, and the rejection does not shift the burden of proof to Applicants for rebuttal. In fact, the rejection must be withdrawn, as the Examiner has failed to meet PTO’s burden in the first place of establishing a proper rejection. There is no proper rejection for Applicants to rebut.

### **III. By Requiring the Patent Applicant to Assert a Particular or Unique Utility, the Patent Examination Utility Guidelines and Training Materials Applied by the Patent Examiner Misstate the Law**

The Training Materials, which direct the Examiners regarding how to apply the Utility Guidelines, address the issue of specificity with reference to two kinds of asserted utilities: “specific” utilities which meet the statutory requirements, and “general” utilities which do not. The Training Materials define a “specific utility” as follows:

A [specific utility] is *specific* to the subject matter claimed. This contrasts to *general* utility that would be applicable to the broad class of invention. For example, a claim to a

polynucleotide whose use is disclosed simply as “gene probe” or “chromosome marker” would not be considered to be specific in the absence of a disclosure of a specific DNA target. Similarly, a general statement of diagnostic utility, such as diagnosing an unspecified disease, would ordinarily be insufficient absent a disclosure of what condition can be diagnosed.

The Training Materials distinguish between “specific” and “general” utilities by assessing whether the asserted utility is sufficiently “particular,” *i.e.*, unique (Training Materials at p.52) as compared to the “broad class of invention.” (In this regard, the Training Materials appear to parallel the view set forth in Stephen G. Kunin, Written Description Guidelines and Utility Guidelines, 82 J.P.T.O.S. 77, 97 (Feb. 2000)(“With regard to the issue of specific utility the question to ask is whether or not a utility set forth in the specification is *particular* to the claimed invention.”)).

Such “unique” or “particular” utilities never have been required by the law. To meet the utility requirement, the invention need only be “practically useful,” *Natta*, 480 F.2d 1 at 1397, and confer a “specific benefit” on the public. *Brenner*, 383 U.S. at 534. Thus incredible, “throw-away” utilities, such as trying to “patent a transgenic mouse by saying it makes great snake food” do not meet this standard. Karen Hall, Genomic Warfare, *The American Lawyer* 68 (June 2000) (quoting John Doll, Chief of the Biotech Section of USPTO).

This does not preclude, however, a general utility, contrary to the statement in the Training Materials where “specific utility” is defined (page 5). Practical real-world uses are not limited to uses that are unique to an invention. The law requires that the practical utility be “definite,” not particular. *Montedison*, 664 F.2d at 375. Appellant is not aware of any court that has rejected an assertion of utility on the grounds that it is not “particular” or “unique” to the specific invention. Where courts have found utility to be too “general,” it has been in those cases in which the asserted utility in the patent disclosure was not a practical use that conferred a specific benefit. That is, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been left to guess as to how to benefit at all from the invention. In *Kirk*, for example, the CCPA held the assertion that a man-made steroid had “useful biological activity” was insufficient where there was no information in the specification as to how that biological activity could be practically used. *Kirk*, 376 F.2d at 941.

The fact that an invention can have a particular use does not provide a basis for requiring a particular use. *See Brana, supra* (disclosure describing a claimed antitumor compound as being homologous to an antitumor compound having activity against a “particular” type of cancer was determined to satisfy the specificity requirement). “Particularity” is not and never has been the *sine qua non* of utility; it is, at most, one of many factors to be considered.

As described *supra*, broad classes of inventions can satisfy the utility requirement so long as a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand how to achieve a practical benefit from knowledge of the class. Only classes that encompass a significant portion of nonuseful members would fail to meet the utility requirement. *Supra* § II.B.2 (*Montedison*, 664 F.2d at 374-75).

The Training Materials fail to distinguish between broad classes that convey information of practical utility and those that do not, lumping all of them into the latter, unpatentable category of “general” utilities. As a result, the Training Materials paint with too broad a brush. Rigorously applied, they would render unpatentable whole categories of inventions heretofore considered to be patentable, and that have indisputably benefitted the public, including the claimed invention. *See supra* § II.B. Thus the Training Materials cannot be applied consistently with the law.

**IV. To the extent the rejection of the patented invention under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, is based on the improper rejection for lack of utility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, it must be reversed.**

The rejection set forth in the Office Action is based on the assertions discussed above, i.e., that the claimed invention lacks patentable utility. To the extent that the rejection under § 112, first paragraph, is based on the improper allegation of lack of patentable utility under § 101, it fails for the same reasons.

**Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first and second paragraphs**

Original claims 5 and 10 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. Original claims 2 and 7 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. The clarifying language of newly added claims 24-39 (corresponding to original claims 2-14, now canceled) render these rejections moot.

**Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)**

Original claims 2-8, 10, and 12-14 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Wei et al. (US Patent No. 5,981,231). SEQ ID NO:25 of the instant application is patentably distinct from SEQ ID NO:2 of US Patent No. 5,981,231 in having Ala instead of Thr at position 23 and in having an additional Ala following the Gln at position 107. Consequently, SEQ ID NO:25 consists of 150 amino acid residues while SEQ ID NO:2 consists of 149 residues. Newly added Claims 24-39 (corresponding to original Claims 2-14, now canceled) clarify the claimed invention and obviate the § 102(e) rejection.

**CONCLUSION**

Applicants respectfully submit that rejections for lack of utility based, *inter alia*, on an allegation of “lack of specificity” as set forth in the Office Action and as justified in the Revised Interim Utility Guidelines and Training Materials, are not supported in the law. Neither are they scientifically correct, nor supported by any evidence or sound scientific reasoning. These rejections are alleged to be founded on facts in court cases such as *Brenner* and *Kirk*, yet those facts are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the instant application, and indeed most if not all nucleotide and protein sequence applications. Nevertheless, the PTO is attempting to draw inaccurate parallels between the facts of these prior cases and pending applications to support unfounded rejections of claims to polypeptide and polynucleotide sequences where biological activity information has not been proven by laboratory experimentation. It has done so by ignoring perfectly acceptable utilities fully disclosed in the specifications as well as well-established utilities known to those of skill in the art. As is disclosed in the specification, and even more clearly, as one of ordinary skill in the art would understand, the claimed invention has well-established, specific, substantial and credible utilities. The rejections are, therefore, improper and should be reversed.

In light of the above amendments and remarks, Applicants submit that the present application is fully in condition for allowance, and request that the Examiner withdraw the outstanding rejections. Early notice to that effect is earnestly solicited.


If the Examiner contemplates other action, or if a telephone conference would expedite allowance of the claims, Applicants invite the Examiner to contact Applicants' Attorney at

(650)855-0555.


Applicants believe that no fee is due with this communication. However, if the USPTO determines that a fee is due, the Commissioner is hereby authorized to charge Deposit Account No. 09-0108. This form is enclosed in duplicate.

Respectfully submitted,  
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